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This paper argues that the problematic of the international and the global has been a 
barrier to understanding the transformation of security discourse over the last decade. 
Academic treatments of security within the discipline of international relations have been 
structured by the traditional liberal binaries, which conceive of political communities 
capable of constituting securing subjects at either the level of the state or the global. 
Today’s dominant framing of the security problematic seems to evade easy articulation 
within this structure and in some readings is seen to presage a transitory stage from the 
international to the global. An alternative reading is sketched out here, that of the post-
liberal, which suggests that the apparent shift towards the global can not be captured from 
within the liberal problematic and highlights that rather than traditional disagreements 
over the nature of the subject of security – the constitution of the securing actor – we are 
witnessing the disappearance of securing agency itself. 
 
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction    
    
The history of the discipline of international relations has been one in which the anarchy 
of the international sphere of sovereign states has been placed in contradistinction to the 
possibility of a global community, held to be the solution to the permanent ‘state of war’ 
among  states  (Hobbes,  1978).  This  framing  is  based  upon  the  grounding  liberal 
assumption of the discipline, the ‘domestic analogy’, expounded by Hedley Bull, wherein 
states assume the status of the originatory subjects of the social contract in a Hobbesian 
state of nature (Bull, 1966). In the liberal problematic, the need for security establishes 
the  sovereign  and  the  state.  International  relations  as  a  discipline  has  traditionally 
measured security in terms of this liberal problematic and is defined by the lack of a global Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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securing subject or sovereign. Since the end of the cold war, this traditional framing of 
international anarchy has been increasingly seen to be giving way to global frameworks of 
security  alleged  to  be  constituted  by  the  growth  of  global  civil  society  and  global 
governance. 
This article suggests that the liberal binaries of the discipline - the international 
and the global – have produced a tendency to frame recent changes as a shift or transition 
from the former to the latter. This has resulted in an aporetic understanding of security 
which has prevented the theorizing of the emergence of post-liberal framings of security, 
posited upon the removal of the securing subject. This is reflected in critiques of the 
hubris of liberal western approaches to peace and development and in frameworks of 
institutional capacity-building, empowerment and resilience, now universally offered as 
solutions to conflict, underdevelopment and state failure.  
The first section re-reads current security discourses of the global in terms of 
the  missing  subject  of  security,  the  lack  of  a  securing  subject.  The  second  section 
heuristically  stakes  out  a  genealogy  of  the  subject  of  security  within  international 
relations, juxtapositioning the traditional liberal binaries against what I describe as a post-
liberal paradigm. The third section will then expand upon the discourse of the resilient 
subject, as one which no longer acts with autonomous agency to secure but instead is 
under the external compulsion to constantly adapt to the external world as a way of 
managing permanent insecurity. 
 
The Missing Subject of Security The Missing Subject of Security The Missing Subject of Security The Missing Subject of Security    
    
For many academic commentators, it appears that there is a contestation at the level of 
both  theorization  and  policy  practice  between  framings  of  the  international  and  the 
global.  Authors  clearly  posing  this  contestation  have  worked  across  the  traditional 
disciplinary  divides,  in  fields  as  diverse  as  realism,  the  English  School,  normative, 
cosmopolitan, critical and poststructuralist theorizing (for example, Morgenthau, 1993; 
Carr,  2001;  Waltz,  1979;  Bull,  1995;  Archibugi,  2000;  Held,  1995;  Linklater,  1998; 
Kaldor, 2003; Booth, 1991; Hardt and Negri, 2001; 2006).  
In these liberal framings of security discourses, the key question at stake is less 
the referent object or the security threat, than the prior political claims, which seek to 
legitimize alternative understandings of the subject of security – the sovereign or securing 
actor. In international framings, the traditional understandings of security within the 
discipline of international relations, the legitimate securing actor is the state. The status 
and legitimacy of the nation state is challenged (either explicitly or implicitly) in global 
framings of security, which posit a higher political authority: that of the immanent global 
state.  R.B.J.  Walker  is  therefore  correct  to  highlight  that  what  is  at  stake  in  the 
contestation of the international and the global is ‘the form of political community’ itself Rethinking the Problematic Subject of Security, Chandler 
 
 
91 
(1997, pp. 70-71). However, even Walker’s critical engagement with security discourse 
remains trapped in the realm of liberal binaries which I argue have less and less purchase 
today. 
While the discipline of international relations was always able to imagine the 
potential  global  state  as  an  alternative  to  the  anarchy  of  international  relations,  its 
existence  as  a  discipline  demonstrated  the  inability  of  this  imaginary  to  become 
constituted in reality. In fact, Bull suggests that it is precisely the limit to the application of 
the ‘domestic analogy’ – the need for a global state to provide security – which needs to 
be  grasped  in  order  to  understand  the  specificity  of  the  discipline  of  international 
relations (1966, pp. 35-36). For Bull, the structuring of the international – on the basis of 
inequality rather than the originatory equality of the liberal subject - appears to limit the 
demand for a global state or for the constitution of political community on the global 
level. No common interest could thereby be politically constituted so as to replicate the 
universal interests of equally vulnerable individuals in the state of nature, which was held 
to produce the possibility of the social contract.  
For  any  shift  to  the  global  to  have  meaning  within  the  liberal  framing  of 
international relations it would have to reflect more than wishful thinking - or in Bull’s 
words  the  displacement  of  ‘description’  with  ‘prescription’  (1995,  p.  266)  –  the 
construction of a global political community and global agency of security would need to 
be demonstrated. It is suggested here that, rather than reading current changes in security 
practices and discourses as reflecting a shift to a global political community, a global 
provider of security, or a global state, we need to engage in theoretical reflection of other 
political possibilities outside the liberal modeling of the ‘domestic analogy’. Only the 
liberal  subject  seeks  to  secure  itself  through  political  community:  through  the 
construction of a securing sovereign agency. It is only a liberal teleological framing which 
leads its adherents to see the apparent decline in states as the bearers of the rights and 
duties of securing as the precursor to a global framing of security and the construction of 
a global subject of security. 
I would like to suggest that the discursive construction of a shift from the 
international to the global can no longer be fully understood in terms of the liberal 
framing  of  politics:  in  the  terms  of  the  traditional  framing  within  the  discipline  of 
international  relations,  which  assumed  that  the  shift  to  the  global  would  necessarily 
presuppose  a  global  political  community  capable  of  resolving  or  ameliorating  the 
problems of security in the anarchical world of nation states. What we term as a shift to 
the  global  is  misleading  and  its  awkwardness  is  expressed  clearly  to  us,  though  the 
dominance of the liberal paradigm makes us blind to its implications. Since the end of the 
1990s, we have been much less likely to use the concept  of ‘global’ with the  liberal 
concept of ‘security’ than we have to express this shift as one towards ‘global insecurity’. 
The shift to global insecurity reveals the hollowness of our conception of the global (see Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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further, Chandler 2009). The fact that the ‘global’ is insecure intimates that this shift does 
not involve the construction of a global state or securing actor, but rather the loss of 
legitimacy of the nation state as the securing subject at the heart of liberal theorizing. 
Rather than the emergence of a new political subject of security, a new form of 
political community or a global state, the shift is away from a political subject of security 
per se. The discourse of security – for so long inseparable from the discursive framing of 
liberal modernity itself - has been cut loose from its liberal moorings. Rather than the new 
dawn of the emergence of a more expansive political subject of security, it seems possible 
that  we  are  awakening  to  a  post-liberal  world  where  the  understanding  of  political 
community is no longer the ontological basis for security discourse. While we still live in a 
world of states, security discourse appears to assume that states no longer constitute 
sovereign subjects of security: the liberal subject of security (produced by the social 
contract). Just as Louis Althusser theorized history as a ‘process without a subject’ (2008) 
today we perhaps need to understand the conditions of possibility for the disciplinary 
dominance of security discourses ‘without a subject’. 
When we talk  about the shift from the international to the global, we  are 
formulating the only way of understanding the shift away from state-centered discourses 
of security from within the liberal paradigm. In the post-liberal paradigm, proposed here, 
this shift could alternatively be understood as the removal or effacing of the subject of 
security. Discourses of global insecurity can be read as presupposing the absence  of 
political community rather than the replacement of one form of political community (the 
nation  state)  with  another  (the  global  state).  If  there  were  no  political  community 
capable of constituting a sovereign or securing agency we would be condemned to a life 
of permanent insecurity. This is the ‘global’, as  constituted by discourses of security 
today:  a  return  to  pre-social  contract  state  of  nature  but  with  no  possibility  of 
transcending  this.  The  global  constitutes  an  unmediated  relationship  between  the 
individual and the outside (the global). With no mediating political community there is 
merely  an  undifferentiated  world  of  insecurity.  Rather  than  collectively  engaging  to 
constitute a securing agent capable of rational instrumental action in the world, we would 
all live under the compulsion of becoming resilient: perpetually condemned to work on 
changing  ourselves  through  adapting  more  efficiently  to  the  innumerable  and 
unknowable threats posed by our external environment. 
Security without a subject capable of acting externally to know and transform 
its environment - without the capacity to secure – can only be expressed as insecurity. If 
we were to be consigned to a pre-political state of nature, we would not have the capacity 
to mediate our relationship to our external world and to provide meaning or to construct 
political communities. We would face a permanent situation of global insecurity and the 
most we could do would be to adapt to and manage insecurities through the practices of 
resilience. The discourse of resilience does not emerge from a liberal problematic of Rethinking the Problematic Subject of Security, Chandler 
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security  but  a  post-liberal  one;  one  which  moves  beyond  liberal  binaries  of  the 
international and the global, effacing any distinction with regard to the constitution of the 
securing subject.  
 
Paradigms of Security Paradigms of Security Paradigms of Security Paradigms of Security    
    
This article is concerned with the shifting understanding of the subject of security within 
the discipline of international relations. In the heuristic terms of paradigm shifts, this 
section draws out three stages: firstly, the subject-based framing of security as a product of 
self-help in the anarchical sphere of the international, which dominated the traditional 
discipline  of  international  relations;  secondly,  the  shift  towards  a  global  discursive 
framework of intervention posed in terms of the weighing of competing concerns of 
human rights and sovereignty - reflected in debates on the ‘right of intervention’ and the 
alleged emergence of a ‘global community’ capable of authorizing such intervention - 
which  was  dominant  in  the  1990s;  and  thirdly,  what  I  describe  as  the  post-liberal 
paradigm,  cohered  in  the  2000s,  which  moved  beyond  the  liberal  problematic, 
reformulating  the  political  subject  in  relation  to  security  in  terms  of  resilience  (the 
capacity to manage internal and external security threats) rather than autonomy (the 
capacity to strategically project interests). In this framework, international security is no 
longer concerned with the liberal problematic of constructing securing agency but with 
the problematic of the impossibility of securing agency: the management of insecurity in 
the absence of the subject of security. 
 
The International Problematic 
 
As touched upon above, the traditional discipline of international relations conceived its 
subject matter in terms of a world of nation state subjects existing or coexisting in a 
relationship of anarchy or a state of nature. Security was understood to be achieved in the 
international sphere purely through the process of self-help. The international sphere was 
one  of  strategic  interaction  in  which  security  was  achieved  through  the  practice  of 
autonomy: strategically deciding whether to act defensively or aggressively, to make or 
break alliances. The preservation of the autonomy of the subjects of security (the agents 
of security – nation states) was the goal of security, with the balance of power and the 
making or breaking of alliances given its organizational rationale by the need to prevent 
any one power becoming dominant over others. The freedom and autonomy of nation 
states was understood as the central means through which they could secure themselves 
and as the end or goal of security policy. In this framing, security and freedom were both 
reflections of the autonomy of the liberal subject. 
In  this  paradigm,  there  were  no  collective  interests  beyond  those  that Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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reinforced the autonomy of the subjects of the international sphere. For this reason, the 
basis of international law or inter-state consensus was that of opposing the hierarchical 
use of power and aggression of powerful states against the less powerful. Freedom and 
security were understood to be synonymous on the basis of the sovereignty of nation 
states. The problem of equilibrium was therefore at the heart of the security problematic, 
exemplified by discussion of the ‘security dilemma’ (coined by John Hertz, 1951; see also 
Butterfield, 1951, p. 19; Wheeler and Booth, 1992, p. 29). Equilibrium was the guide to 
policy-making for the securing subject of international relations theory: if states armed 
themselves  for  reasons  of  defense  or  attack  then  other  states  would  take  similar 
precautions, similarly if a state became too powerful relative to others, then other states 
would make alliances against them. The doctrine of the balance of power reflected the 
traditional international relations understanding of the problematic of maintaining an 
equilibrium of forces. 
It  is important  to  note  that  the  problem  of  equilibrium  was  one  that  was 
understood to be open to resolution or amelioration by nation states as active subjects of 
security. The problem of equilibrium was a geo-strategic one in which rational actions 
were presupposed on behalf of all actors. This enabled strategic balancing, negotiations, 
alliances, and the whole range of international diplomacy. While the equilibrium was one 
which was constantly shifting this was understood as a problematic that was open to 
statesmanship and rational calculation. Of course, there was always an important element 
of contingency and indeterminacy, but the discipline of international relations was based 
on the capacity to structure and model the contingent effects of the rational choices of 
state actors.  
 
The Global Problematic 
 
The traditional framing of the international sphere assumed that freedom and security 
were indivisible at the level of the securing subject – the nation state. This stood in stark 
contrast to global approaches in which the constitution of a global sovereign was held to 
imply that freedom and security were a matter of balancing the particular interests of 
states and the collective interests of the global political community. The relationship 
between  freedom  and  security  within  the  global  paradigm  of  international  relations 
replicated that of liberal political theory as it applied to the internal sovereign realm. The 
global liberal problematic is that of intervention: the discussion of when those acting as 
global  sovereigns  should  intervene  and  act  to  limit  the  freedom  and  autonomy  of 
sovereign states on the basis of norms which were held to have universal assent. In the 
1990s, the reframing of the international sphere as a global one and one amenable to 
liberal discourses of intervention posited the emergence of a global sovereign capable of 
weighing a balance of security and freedom in terms of a liberal framing, in which the Rethinking the Problematic Subject of Security, Chandler 
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rights  of  states  –  of  sovereignty  -  were  weighed  against  the  collective  interests  of 
international society.  
Michel  Foucault  usefully  described  the  liberal  paradigm  of  the  discursive 
framing of freedom and security  in terms of intervention  as the ‘liberal economy of 
power’ sustained by the constant ‘interplay of freedom and security’ (2008, p. 65). For 
Foucault,  the  policy  problematic  of  intervention  depended  upon  the  balancing  of 
particular freedoms against the security of the community:  
 
The principle of calculation is what is called security. That is to say, liberalism, 
the liberal art of government, is forced to determine the precise extent to which 
and up to  what point individual  interest, that is to say individual interests 
insofar as they are different and possibly opposed to each other, constitute a 
danger for the interest of all. (ibid., p. 65) 
 
The global liberal paradigm of freedom and security is very different from that of the 
equilibrium of the international operating without a putative universal sovereign capable 
of  weighing  such  a  balance.  In  the  1990s,  in  the  wake  of  the  end  of  the  cold  war, 
discourses  of  intervention  emerged  in  regard  to  international  relations  on  the 
presupposition  that  the  international  sphere  was  now  open  to  a  global  liberal 
appropriation, with the immanent emergence of an international or global consensus 
capable of generating the legitimacy for collective security in which an interventionist 
discourse  was  possible.  This  presupposed  that  interventionist  states  were  capable  of 
assuming the mantle of a global sovereign and that their actions, securing through a ‘right 
of  intervention’,  could  be  legitimized  on  the  basis  of  their  capacity  to  represent  the 
common norms of a global community. 
 
The Post-Liberal Problematic  
 
The earlier liberal paradigms grasped the international political sphere in two distinct 
ways:  firstly,  as  a  sphere  of  international  relations  -  of  sovereign  states  without  a 
government;  in  which  case,  the  only  mechanism  of  securing  the  subject  was  by 
autonomously determined equilibrium; secondly, as global – analogous to the domestic 
sphere of government, of sovereign rule, in which intervention could secure the collective 
norms of the global community. In both these frameworks, it is suggested that freedom 
and security are mutually reproducing: they are two sides of the same coin. It is not 
possible to have freedom without security or security without freedom. In fact, it is not 
possible to understand the meaning of either freedom or security without the liberal 
starting  assumption  of  the  pre-given  or  natural  autonomous  political  subject.  The 
paradigm of the international shared the same starting point as that of the global: that of Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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the autonomous political subject. 
What I describe as the post-liberal paradigm of international relations departs 
from  this  shared  starting  point  of  the  securing  capacity  of  the  autonomous  political 
subject. This has fundamental implications, as without the rationalist assumptions of 
originatory autonomy, the connection between freedom and security is broken and both 
terms lose their traditional liberal meaning. Without the centrality of autonomy both 
freedom and security become problematic illusions. In this paradigm, there is a return to 
the traditional international problematic of international relations – that of equilibrium – 
but it is a problematic  constructed as global but without rational  agency or rational 
subjects which are the subjects capable of constituting securing subjects. Equilibrium 
refers to the problematic of ‘global security’ or of collective security threats. These threats 
are understood to derive independently of conscious or rational human agency. Whether 
the  threats  are  understood  in  terms  of  environmental  warming,  global  economic 
downturn, resource depletion, refugees, crime, poverty, conflict or terrorism, they are 
understood  to  elude  the  capacity  of  any  securing  subject,  either  collectively  or 
individually.  
The security threats of the post-liberal global problematic are not open to 
traditional strategic engagement as they lack rational agency: it is believed that terrorists 
cannot be negotiated with any more than carbon emissions and also that these global 
security threats cannot be overcome: the war on terror cannot be ‘won’ anymore than the 
war on global warming or poverty. Security becomes a process of management, in which 
the free play of autonomy, necessary for the construction of the liberal subject of security, 
becomes  seen  as  problematic.  The  fact  that  these  threats  cannot  be  secured  against 
successfully means that the problem is not just that states acting individually cannot 
resolve  the  security  threats,  but  that  states  acting  collectively  cannot  resolve  them, 
through policy intervention. The governmental rationale of achieving this post-liberal 
security equilibrium is that of attempting to manage risk and to act preventively, upon the 
self,  seeking  to  adapt  to  threats  –  whether  from  terrorists  or  the  environment.  This 
framework lacks a liberal securing subject or agency. The task of security is an ongoing 
one of relationship management and of adaptation to external forces or threats, which 
cannot be precisely known or secured against. 
In the post-liberal discourse of global insecurity, the problematic of adaptation 
and equilibrium is one of resilience: of the capacity to adapt to and balance external 
pressures.  In  this  discursive  framing,  the  weak  link  in  the  development  of  collective 
mechanisms of balance and equilibrium are those states which are unable or unwilling to 
develop the practices of adaptation and resilience: the self-limitation of good governance. 
This is the reason why, in the post-liberal security paradigm, weak or failing states are 
considered to be the most important security threat. This is not because they themselves 
are literally a threat – in the way that ‘rogue states’ where in the past – but rather because Rethinking the Problematic Subject of Security, Chandler 
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they can become the unwitting vehicles of these threats. This is well described by leading 
policy analysts Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart: 
 
A number of contemporary global crises have their roots in forty to sixty fragile 
countries.  As  these  states  have  experienced  prolonged  conflict  or  misrule, 
networks of criminality, violence, and terror have solidified, providing an ever 
expanding platform that threatens the entire globe. (2008, p. 23) 
 
Weak or failing states are understood to undermine the security of international society 
as a whole in that they are held to provide ‘an ever expanding platform’ for global security 
threats to gain a foothold, develop and then expand at the risk of ‘the entire globe’. 
Dealing with the problem of weak or failing states in the post-liberal paradigm 
of international relations does not rely on a liberal discourse of intervention, as there is no 
rationalist assumption of a securing subject. Failing states are held to lack the capacity to 
secure themselves or to prevent themselves from becoming security threats to others. At 
the same time, there is no assumption that external agency, acting as constituted global 
sovereigns, can secure failing states. The post-liberal discourse asserts the solution of 
preventive self-management – this is the return of self-help but globalised in the sense 
that  external  intervention  is  orientated  around  assisting  others  to  help  themselves. 
Intervention  does  not  take  the  liberal  form  of  post-hoc  securing,  developing  or 
democratizing but the post-liberal form of the preventive inculcation of capacity- or 
capability-building in order to strengthen adaptive efficiency. 
 
Resilience: Subjects without Security Resilience: Subjects without Security Resilience: Subjects without Security Resilience: Subjects without Security    
    
In what is described here as the post-liberal paradigm of international relations, the most 
important conceptual shift from that of a classic liberal framework is the lack of a securing 
subject or a subject of security. This lack of a subject, which is able to secure, is intimately 
bound up with the transformation in the meaning of the core concept in international 
relations: that of sovereignty. Today’s security discourses are based on a quite distinct 
approach from the liberal framings which sharply distinguished between the existence of 
a sovereign order - making progress, justice and ethics possible - and the inter-sovereign 
order of the international in which security involved self-help mechanisms of the balance 
of power. The solution to the lack of sovereign order in the international sphere is not 
that of constituting a global sovereign – the nation state writ large – but of restricting 
sovereign autonomy at the level of the state. While, discursively, it may be concerned with 
strengthening  states,  it  conceives  of  this  as  a  process  of  limiting  or  regulating  their 
autonomy.  
Once  autonomy  is  problematized,  the  concept  of  sovereignty  or  of  self-Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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government  or  self-determination  is  no  longer  equated  with  the  subject  capacity  to 
secure. Sovereignty or self-government apply to a range of capacities for self-limitation 
rather  than  to  self-direction  or  the  establishment  of  autonomous  political  goals  or 
aspirations. The capacity of states to act as political communities - as sovereign, i.e. self-
governing, actors - is seen as necessitating limitation. Autonomy becomes not the goal of 
security practices but rather their precondition. The liberal subject of security – the 
sovereign actor - in this sense is the problem rather than the solution. In this framing, the 
problem of failed and failing states is precisely that they are too autonomous and lack the 
capacity for self-limitation. It is their autonomy that is understood to be cutting them off 
from  developmental  opportunities,  preventing  sustainable  solutions  to  conflict, 
facilitating  environmental  degradation,  and  so  forth.  From  Nobel  prize-winning 
development theorists, such as Amartya Sen and Douglass North, to leading security 
theorists, such as Paul Collier, the problem of insecurity is understood to be one of 
problematic ‘choices’ made by autonomous subjects (Sen, 1990; North, 1990, 2005; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2006).  
The problematization of autonomy is given the status of commonsense in 
current  security  discourses  as  there  is  an  assumption  that  autonomy  is  no  longer  a 
positive attribute even for advanced western states. Autonomy is increasingly seen as a 
potential  threat  that  needs  to  be  limited,  particularly  through  international  policy 
networks of good governance. The EU, for example, is explicitly understood to be an 
institutional  mechanism  for  the  limiting  of  the  autonomy  of  its  member  states.  To 
attempt to assert or defend autonomy against the discursive dynamic of global insecurity 
is, in itself, considered to be a problematic sign. It is the discussion of autonomy, in the 
context of globalisation, which perhaps most clearly highlights the incommensurability 
between the liberal paradigm and the post-liberal one. 
According to leading social theorists, such as Anthony Giddens, David Held 
and Ulrich Beck, globalisation undermines the previous rationale of sovereign autonomy: 
claims of control and direction over society - the ability to act instrumentally or as a 
securing agent. In this way, globalisation has been held to make the sovereignty claims, so 
essential  to  liberal  modernity,  meaningless.  This  lack  of  instrumental  capacity  is 
conceived of as invalidating claims to sovereign status – claims to the constitution of 
securing subjects - both domestically and in the international arena. In fact, globalisation 
is held to undermine the notion of a division between these two spheres of activity. For 
Ulrich Beck, national sovereignty is undermined by the fact that globalisation disrupts the 
links between territory and authority, making the distinction between territories, and the 
framework of legitimacy for government power, increasingly problematic (Beck, 1997; 
2005). Taken to its extreme, Giddens refers to the work of business guru Keniche Ohmae 
that: ‘we live now in a borderless world, in which the nation state has become a “fiction” 
and where politicians have lost all effective power’ (Giddens, 1998, p. 29; Ohmae, 1990; Rethinking the Problematic Subject of Security, Chandler 
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1995).  
Globalisation, here acts as a shorthand explanation for why it appears that state 
autonomy can no longer be the central way of conceiving the legitimacy of governmental 
power or of rationalizing security policy practices, either domestically or internationally. 
The importance of the globalisation thesis lays less in its explanatory claims for this shift 
than  in  its  widespread  acceptance  as  a  marker  for  the  transformed  nature  of  our 
understanding of both security and autonomy. In a complex, global, interconnected, and 
increasingly insecure and uncertain world it appears that policy-making autonomy is a 
problem rather than a framework for resolving problems of policy-making. Globalisation 
poses  the  question  that  if  autonomy  is  potentially  dangerous  and  destabilizing,  how 
should governments govern, or secure themselves? The answer to this question can be 
seen  in  the  rationalities  for  governance  developed  in  the  discourses  of  international 
security, in which the limiting of sovereignty is essential for the management of insecurity. 
 
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion    
    
In the post-liberal framing sketched here, the discursive blurring of liberal conceptions of 
the international and the global can be understood as the result of the removal of the 
subject of security. Security discourse can no longer be captured by the binary framings of 
the liberal problematic. The security rationale of the global is post-liberal: it combines 
both the equilibrium of the international and the intervention of the global but under a 
completely different conception of the security problematic,  one which inverses and 
transforms  the  conceptual  framing  of  the  liberal  ontology  which  presupposes  the 
autonomous  rational  subject.  In  this  paradigm,  freedom  and  security  are  both 
problematized as ends in themselves and as means to an end. Freedom is externally 
constrained  by  the  lack  of  capacity  to  secure  and  security  is  constrained  by  the 
problematic of freedom or autonomy. It is the post-liberal conception of the human 
condition which produces insecurity rather than security, in that we cannot know the 
consequences of our actions (North, 2005; Coker, 2008; Beck, 2004; Bauman, 2009; see 
also Arendt, 1998; Althusser, 2008; Chandler, 2010).  
In a world held to be rapidly changing and where globalised threats are not 
easy to recognize and respond to, security is no longer the goal of state policy, but rather 
resilience: the capacity to respond and adapt to new threats and to manage a world of 
complexity and uncertainty. In this paradigm, autonomy is no longer understood with 
reference to the capacity to generate policy-direction and goals internally. Security is 
addressed through the development of resilience: through the realization that we cannot 
understand  the  complex  balance  of  threats  and  needs  generated  through  global 
interdependencies and therefore need to look internally to our capacities to adapt to the 
exigencies of an unknown and constantly threatening world.  Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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1 This paper was prepared for the closing keynote of the annual conference of the Global 
Studies Association, ‘International and the Global’, Oxford University, 1-3 September 
2010. 
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